社説:安保転換を問う 安全保障法成立

September 19, 2015 (Mainichi Japan)
Editorial: Diet distorts Constitution by passing security bills into law
社説:安保転換を問う 安全保障法成立


The Diet's enactment of the security-related legislation, opening the way for Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense, has raised serious questions about the fate of Japan's democratic politics. Numerous members of the public, including those who staged demonstrations against the legislation in front of the Diet building and elsewhere, undoubtedly have questions over the legislation, feel angry and are worried about the laws.

The House of Councillors passed the bills, which will drastically change Japan's basic national policy that the country has nurtured since the end of World War II, into law at a plenary session without addressing numerous questions and inconsistencies.

With the enactment of the legislation, Japan can exercise the right to collective self-defense, and the overseas activities of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) will be drastically expanded.

Ruling coalition legislators, who belong to the legislative branch of the government, would not listen to the opinions of constitutional scholars and other experts who raised suspicions that the legislation violates the Constitution, which is the country's supreme law.


Yoshitada Konoike, chairman of the upper house special committee on the legislation, was quoted as saying that "I thought that there were so many flawed answers" that officials of the executive branch gave to questions during deliberations on the bills. Konoike made the remark after the panel railroaded the bills on Sept. 17 amid confusion. The minute of the session only states, "Impossible to hear" what the chairman and other members said during voting because of the confusion.

One cannot help but wonder how many ruling coalition legislators can proudly say the Diet had thorough debate on the bills.

The governing bloc not only unilaterally terminated deliberations at the committee but also submitted and passed a motion calling for limiting the time for debate on censure motions and other resolutions that opposition parties submitted in a bid to block the passage of the bills at a plenary session.

In other words, the citadel of discourse suppressed debate. The ruling coalition acted as if to say opposition parties should stop useless resistance because ruling coalition legislators far outnumber those from opposition parties.

Opposition parties attempted to block the move to pass the bills into law by also submitting a no-confidence motion against the Cabinet of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the House of Representatives. However, legislators from the ruling bloc obviously felt they were simply waiting as time passed.

Throughout Diet deliberations, the Abe government maintained its self-righteous attitude with which it dismissed any opposition and opinions calling for prudence in enacting the legislation.

Numerous members of the general public are dissatisfied with and worried about the Abe administration's high-handed manner in which it dealt with the bills and the Diet that failed to stop the government's move as well as the contents of the laws.

It was one of Prime Minister Abe's long-cherished goals to open the way for Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense. The move leading up to the enactment of the security legislation began in summer 2014 when the Abe Cabinet reversed the government's longstanding interpretation of the war-renouncing Constitution as banning Japan from exercising this right.

However, constitutional scholars and other experts pointed out one after another that the security bills are unconstitutional and public opposition to the bills intensified. However, the prime minister and other top government officials responded by only citing the 1959 Supreme Court ruling on the so-called Sunagawa Incident, in which the top court said Japan inherently has the right to self-defense, and other views, but failed to provide any convincing counter-argument to critics.

Article 98 of the Constitution stipulates that the Constitution is "the supreme law of the nation," and that no law contrary to the Constitution "shall have legal force or validity." The prime minister and other top government officials should know this. However, Yosuke Isozaki, an adviser to the prime minister who played a leading role in developing the legislation, stated that "legal stability is irrelevant."

This remark by Isozaki apparently reflects the true intentions of the Abe government. It is no exaggeration to say the administration went beyond the bounds of its authority as the executive branch and distorted the Constitution. Ruling coalition legislators went along with the move without raising questions. Komeito, the LDP's junior ruling coalition partner, also bears serious responsibility as it helped quickly enact the legislation while being aware that some of the party's supporters were opposing the bills.


Article 99 of the Constitution states that the Emperor or the Regent as well as Cabinet ministers, Diet members, judges and all other public servants "have the obligation to respect and uphold the Constitution." It is the basic principle of constitutionalism that the Constitution is not something that binds members of the public but something that restrains those in power and prevents them from abusing their power.

However, a draft of a new Constitution that the LDP worked out in 2012 states that the people should be aware that their freedom and rights are accompanied by duties and responsibilities and must not run counter to public good and public order.

The LDP's tendency to place priority on the state over individuals' rights has been growing since Prime Minister Abe returned to power in late 2012. The enactment of the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets in 2013 and the security legislation is part of this tendency.

Diet deliberations on the security bills failed to clarify the criteria for cases in which Japan can deploy Self-Defense Forces (SDF) troops overseas under the legislation.

In other words, such decisions are left largely to the discretion of the executive branch of the government.

Needless to say, the procedure for gaining approval of overseas deployment of SDF personnel from the Diet is of great importance.

However, serious questions remain as to whether the legislative branch can check whether dispatching SDF personnel overseas is appropriate in each mission, considering the way legislators deliberated the bills.

In 1960, the Diet ratified revisions to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty while fierce demonstrations against the move were staged outside the Diet building, just like the latest enactment of the security legislation. After then Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, Abe's grandfather, stepped down, his successor Hayato Ikeda pledged to double the people's income, shifting the government's emphasis from security to economic growth.

Prime Minister Abe is expected to emphasize that his government will again attach importance to economic policies.

The prime minister and the ruling coalition made haste to enact the security legislation for fear that if deliberations on the bills continued until shortly before the summer 2016 upper house election, it would adversely affect the governing bloc's chance of winning the race.

The coalition apparently wants members of the public to forget the security legislation as soon as possible.

All the more because of this, members of the public must not forget legislators who helped the government recklessly move to enact the legislation by force of numbers.

毎日新聞 2015年09月19日 02時30分


社説:安保転換を問う 参院委採決強行 民意に背を向けた政権

September 18, 2015 (Mainichi Japan)
Editorial: Abe gov't turns its back on public opinion
社説:安保転換を問う 参院委採決強行 民意に背を向けた政権

Controversial legislation opening the way for Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense was rammed through a House of Councillors special committee on security policy on Sept. 17. It was an abnormal way of approving the bills, as it cannot be confirmed whether the panel actually put the bills to a vote amid loud protests from opposition party lawmakers.

The executive branch of the government failed to convince the public that the bills are either constitutional or necessary, even after over 200 hours of deliberations in both houses of the Diet. Nevertheless, the ruling coalition went ahead with the vote while being aware that it had failed to narrow a perception gap with the public over the issue. Therefore, the vote cannot be considered a conclusion arrived at through the democratic process, as Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has emphasized.


The bills were put to a vote while committee Chairman Yoshitada Konoike could not even be seen behind the pushing, shoving jumble of lawmakers scrumming around his desk in the committee room. As soon as a no-confidence motion against Konoike was voted down and he took a seat, ruling and opposition party legislators rushed to the chairman's seat and surrounded him. What Konoike said when he put the bills to a vote could not be heard. One cannot help but wonder what such a violent vote looked like in the eyes of the public.

The situation in the upper house shifted drastically after a local hearing on the bills was held in Yokohama on Sept. 16. The ruling coalition attempted to conclude a question-and-answer session in the special committee on the bills and put the proposed legislations to a vote, while opposition parties tried to block the move.

Protesters staged demonstrations against the bills in many areas, including in front of the Diet building, on a daily basis, and opinion polls conducted by various media outlets show a large majority opposing passage of the legislation during the current Diet session. As the ongoing Diet session ends on Sept. 27, the ruling coalition is rushing to enact the legislation apparently for fear that demonstrations and other forms of protests against the bills could grow during the five-day holiday period beginning on Sept. 19. If the governing coalition feared public sentiment against the bills, it should have abandoned enacting the bills during the current session.

The Abe Cabinet's biggest mistake in drawing up the security bills, and thereby open by any and all means at the administration's disposal the way for Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense, was its failure to hold calm and measured debate on the realities of Japan's changing security environment, including China's rise.

Under parliamentary democracy, legislative processes are left to the discretion of members of the Diet, who are representatives of the public. However, legislators must hold thorough debate on policy issues and try all possible roads to consensus.

Moreover, the security bills affect the basis of the Constitution, which stipulates that Japan must be a peaceful country. The Abe Cabinet twisted the government's 1972 official view that Japan could not exercise the right to collective self-defense to make it possible. Such being the case, many constitutional scholars have concluded that the bills are unconstitutional.

The executive branch also failed to provide a clear explanation of why the development of security legislation is necessary. The government had initially placed special emphasis on minesweeping in the Strait of Hormuz in the Middle East as an example of operations that Japan can conduct by exercising the right to collective self-defense, but later stated that it does not specifically assume such a mission will take place. The government's explanation became increasingly unclear as deliberations on the bills progressed.

The governing coalition could have pursued common ground with key opposition parties over the bills through negotiations on modification of the bills. The executive branch submitted 11 security-related bills in a package to the Diet. However, some bills, including one on Japan's participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations, should have been separated from the package.

Prime Minister Abe appears to have lacked any willingness to face the public and try to win their understanding.

When he dissolved the House of Representatives late last year for a snap general election, Prime Minister Abe called it the "Abenomics dissolution," and declared that he would ask voters if he should go ahead with the Abenomics economic policy mix. However, security legislation was characterized as just one of numerous election pledges. Neither did the prime minister place emphasis on the bills during his policy speech at the outset of the current Diet session.


The government had failed to provide a sufficient explanation even before the bills were submitted to the legislative branch, or to show its eagerness to deepen public understanding of the proposed legislation through Diet deliberations.

In 2013, the Abe Cabinet also forcibly enacted the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets, which the ruling Liberal Democratic Party had not even listed in its election pledges. If the administration had decided that the security measures needed by Japan exceeded the limitations set by the Constitution, the government should have sought constitutional amendments through a national referendum, should have asked the sovereign citizens of this country for their backing.

Scholars, legal experts, local assemblies and people across the generations have launched campaigns against the security legislation. If the government attempts to change basic national policy without making the issue a point of contention during an election campaign, peaceful demonstrations are one of voters' limited means of protest. Aki Okuda, a member of the Students Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy-s (SEALDs) organization, told a national hearing at the upper house special panel, "It's you members of the ruling bloc that created the current situation." He was right on-point.

Most of the opposition parties are strongly opposed to the bills. It is true that opposition parties played a certain role in grilling the government over the contents of the bills and the administration's attitude toward the issue through Diet debate.

However, opposition parties' failure to block the ruling coalition from putting the bills to a vote is not attributable solely to a lack of numbers in the Diet. The DPJ failed to produce any counter-proposal to the government-sponsored legislation. Despite its criticism of the bills, the DPJ has failed to gain support from voters. It is also true that the government thought that railroading the bills would not deal a fatal blow to the administration, as the opposition parties lack strong public backing.

For Prime Minister Abe, ramming the bills through the upper house panel may recall his grandfather Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi's administration's railroading of a resolution to ratify an amended Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

However, politics that makes light of consensus would split the public. Any political method that places priority on the administration's goals at the cost of public understanding would fundamentally damage the public's trust in politics.

Serious questions remain as to whether laws deeply relevant to basic national policy should be created through such reckless procedures. We once again express stiff opposition to enacting the security legislation.

毎日新聞 2015年09月18日 東京朝刊


社説:安保転換を問う 参院委採決へ 国民の納得には程遠い

September 17, 2015 (Mainichi Japan)
Editorial: Public understanding of security bills far from sufficient
社説:安保転換を問う 参院委採決へ 国民の納得には程遠い

Deliberations in the House of Councillors over a set of government backed security-related bills remain tense. The ruling coalition parties are prepared to complete a questioning session in the Special Committee on Legislation for the Peace and Security of Japan and the International Community, where the bills are being discussed, and put the bills to a vote.

Ahead of a planned vote, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its coalition partner Komeito reached an agreement with three opposition parties -- the Assembly to Energize Japan, the Party for Future Generations and the New Renaissance Party -- on the details of a supplementary resolution. A meeting of leaders of the five parties was also held with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in attendance.

The ruling parties are saying that the environment for voting on the legislation has been prepared. But the nature of the bills remains unchanged, and we are far from able to say that the public is convinced.

After the special committee held a regional public hearing in Yokohama on Sept. 16, ruling and opposition parties wrangled into the night over whether a final questioning session would be held. If the ruling coalition forces a vote on the legislation, the opposition parties are prepared to resist with countermeasures, including submitting a no-confidence resolution against the Abe Cabinet.

Under the agreement reached between the five political parties, when the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are dispatched overseas, a supplementary resolution and Cabinet decision would be incorporated to bolster Diet involvement in the process.

When dispatching SDF members to the Persian Gulf, for example, and exercising the right to collective self-defense in situations not linked directly to an armed attack on Japan, advance approval would be sought from the Diet without exception, and the activities of dispatched SDF members would be reported to the Diet every 180 days.

The three opposition parties that reached the agreement with the ruling coalition are small parties with just 14 upper house seats. But the fact that they informally decided to support the security bills under this agreement, means the ruling parties can avoid passing the bills by their own weight alone -- a welcome development for the coalition.

The question over how the Diet can control the SDF is an important point of discussion. But supplementary resolutions, with no written amendments to the law, are not binding. And the "appropriate response" forming the backdrop to Cabinet decisions is vague. In cases not involving a direct armed attack on Japan, it is only natural for the Diet to give advance approval. It is difficult to say that checks will be thoroughly implemented through the agreement between the ruling coalition and three opposition parties.

Furthermore, the agreement does nothing to fundamentally amend the legislation, which has been criticized by many constitutional scholars as being unconstitutional. Surely what's really happening is that the ruling coalition is putting up a camouflage to avoid being criticized for voting on the bills on its own steam. The stance of the three opposition parties in settling on a loose agreement is questionable.

Aside from the agreement between the five parties, discussions between the ruling coalition and the Japan Innovation Party on amending the legislation fell apart. Just like with deliberations in the House of Representatives, which ended unsatisfactorily, we cannot conclude that the ruling parties are showing any great desire to search seriously for common ground. The ruling parties should really have seriously considered such options as leaving out the questionable parts of the bills.

Day after day, people opposed to the security bills have staged rallies around the National Diet Building, and protests have spread across Japan.

The reason that the ruling parties are fixated upon passing the legislation into law on Sept. 18 is surely because they are worried about protests expanding over the weekend or during the subsequent "Silver Week" national holidays. If they really fear public opinion then forcing a vote on the bills is something they should avoid.

毎日新聞 2015年09月17日 東京朝刊


社説:安保関連法案 成立に強く反対する

September 16, 2015 (Mainichi Japan)
Editorial: We strongly oppose passage of government-backed security bills
社説:安保関連法案 成立に強く反対する

Does Prime Minister Shinzo Abe think he's a prophet?

"The public's understanding and support toward the security bills will undoubtedly spread after the bills are enacted and time passes," he told the House of Councillors special committee on special legislation on Sept. 14.

Saying that "people will understand in time" while having provided no convincing counterarguments to the many objections that have been voiced against the bills demonstrates the great extent to which Abe, full of conceit, belittles the public.

The objections toward the bills are not temporary, nor are they purely emotional. They are based on the real fear of the possibility that common sense will be distorted and Japan's accomplishments over the years as a peaceful nation will be sabotaged.

Japan's national security policy is the result of a delicate balancing act between war-renouncing Article 9 of the Constitution and the Japan-U.S. security treaty. It has comprised the solid backbone of post-World War II Japan, born from a coexistence of deep remorse for a reckless war and the realistic need to protect the country.

However, the security bills now before the Diet, if passed, would greatly reduce the binding force of Article 9, allowing the center of gravity of Japan's security policy to shift dramatically to the Japan-U.S. security alliance.

Seventy years have passed since the end of World War II. There would be room for debate if this significant change in policy were being taken through the appropriate legal channels. But that has not been the case.

In the nearly four months that these bills have been under deliberation in the Diet, close Abe aide Yosuke Isozaki's comment that legal stability is irrelevant has left the strongest impression. Those words, uttered by the Abe government's core national security strategist, have made the philosophy behind the bills' design glaringly obvious.

The administration is placing utmost priority on military demands based on Cold War-era thinking. In one swift move, it made a complete about-face on an interpretation of the Constitution that had been maintained for over 40 years, citing "changes in the environment." And when a former Supreme Court chief justice pointed out the many holes in the bills' logic, the prime minister brushed the criticism aside, saying the former justice was now merely "a private citizen."

Abe has called on China to observe the rule of law in light of its growing naval presence, but has shown blatant disregard for legal order in his own country. He has exceeded the authority given to him.

The security bills are flawed not only in their quality, but also in their volume. Under the banner of guaranteeing "seamless" responses to security situations, the bills aim to maximize the range of activities the Japan Self-Defense Forces are permitted to carry out.

Among the activities that the bills would allow the SDF to conduct are logistics support on a global scale, the provision of ammunition to foreign militaries, and the protection of the U.S. military's weapons without prior approval by the Diet. Any one of these stipulations would be a significant deviation from current policy, but they were submitted to the Diet lumped together as two bills. Because of this, some aspects of the bills have barely been addressed by the Diet.

Since risk management is one of the core responsibilities of the state, it must prepare for possible dangers. However, the process of deciding how to protect the country must meet certain standards in a range of areas, including legal stability, national strength and the public's understanding and support.

The security bills backed by the Abe Cabinet meet none of these criteria. And yet, the ruling coalition is trying to rush these half-baked bills to a vote.

Politics is the process of selecting the course a country takes. Political leaders are simultaneously responsible for undertaking that process and for bringing the public together. We cannot abide the prime minister's pipe dream that time will solve everything, when he has not demonstrated any prospects for repairing the deep rifts that run through Japanese society.

Japan is at a crossroads, perhaps its biggest since the end of World War II. We face a watershed moment as significant as or more significant than the 1954 establishment of the Self-Defense Forces or the 1960 revision of the Japan-U.S. security treaty. We are greatly alarmed that taking the wrong fork in the road will inflict great injury on our country.

毎日新聞 2015年09月16日 02時30分


社説:安保転換を問う 週内採決方針 議会政治壊すつもりか

September 15, 2015 (Mainichi Japan)
Editorial: Ruling coalition wrong to put security bills to quick vote
社説:安保転換を問う 週内採決方針 議会政治壊すつもりか

"We shouldn't resort to the force of numbers to suppress opposition. We should humbly reflect on what we do, and work hard to persuade opponents to accept our proposals in an effort to form a consensus."

This is what the late former Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira, who was a member of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), once said.

Ohira, who called for "politics of consensus" and "politics conducted in unison with the public," also said, "Those who do not support us (the LDP) are also members of the public."

This is what political leaders should respect in all eras, and is the basic principle of parliamentary democracy.


As 60 days have passed since the security-related bills were referred to the House of Councillors following their passage through the House of Representatives, the lower chamber can now pass the bills into law in a second vote by a two-thirds majority.

Under Article 59 of the Constitution, "failure by the House of Councillors to take final action within 60 days after receipt of a bill passed by the House of Representatives, with time in recess excepted, may be determined to constitute a rejection of the bill" by the upper chamber. The same clause stipulates that a bill voted down by the upper chamber can be passed into law by the lower house in a second vote by two-thirds of members present.

One cannot help but wonder how Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who is desperate to ensure that the bills will be passed into law during the current Diet session, takes Ohira's words. It's like Abe is thinking, it would be unavoidable to enact the legislation even if it cannot win public understanding.

As the prime minister says, in the end, any decision is made by a majority vote in parliamentary politics. However, deliberations have clarified that the security-related bills in question should not become law. First of all, the executive branch of the government failed to provide a convincing explanation to the public in response to experts' arguments that the bills would constitute a violation of the war-renouncing Constitution. Nor did the government clearly explain why Japan needs to exercise the right to collective self-defense, which means coming to the aid of allies under armed attack even if Japan itself is not attacked. The purpose of the bills has become increasingly unclear as deliberations progressed.

There are flaws in the methods of deliberating the bills as well.

In late May, shortly before the lower chamber launched deliberations on the security bills, the Mainichi Shimbun in an editorial commented that the prime minister should change his attitude in refusing to listen to opposition and calls for prudence in enacting security legislation.

However, it is regrettable that the prime minister only held black-or-white, friend-or-foe sorts of discussions during Diet deliberations on the bills.

Moreover, Prime Minister Abe showed his arrogance by saying things like, "Ask your questions quickly" and "Never mind such a thing," to interrupt questions by opposition legislators.

Yosuke Isozaki, an adviser to the prime minister, also stated during a meeting in his home constituency, "Legal stability is irrelevant," suggesting that consistency between the security bills and the war-renouncing Constitution is unimportant. Numerous members of the general public interpreted his remark as revealing the government's true intentions.

In a study session organized by junior LDP legislators, one member remarked that advertising revenue should be cut off to media outlets that are opposed to the bills. There is a growing tendency to suppress opposing opinions.

The bills were drafted based on the Abe Cabinet's decision in July 2014 to reverse the government's longstanding interpretation of the Constitution in a limited way to open the way for Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense. However, Prime Minister Abe declared during the campaign for the December 2014 lower house race that his decision to postpone the planned consumption tax hike was the key point of contention. With regard to the security bills, the LDP only stated in the last half of its some 300 campaign pledge topics that security legislation would be swiftly developed to ensure seamless responses to contingencies.

In his policy speech at the outset of the current Diet session in February this year, the prime minister only briefly said the government would aim to be able to ensure a seamless response to any situation. On the other hand, Abe pledged in his speech before U.S. Congress in late April that Japan would enact security legislation by summer. At the time, the government had not even submitted the bills to the Diet.

What Abe has done shows that he makes light of the Diet, elections and the general public. He would be extremely self-righteous if he were to believe that the public has given him carte blanche by giving the LDP a majority in the lower chamber.


Prime Minister Abe cited the amendment made to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960 when his grandfather Nobusuke Kishi was prime minister to justify the security legislation. "At the time, the revisions were criticized as Japan could be dragged into war, but history has proved that the amendment wasn't wrong," Abe said. He has repeated similar remarks.

LDP Vice President Masahiko Komura said, "Japan couldn't have set up the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), revised the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty or enacted the Act on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations if Japan had relied on public opinion of the moment."

Demonstrations protesting against the bills, mainly those around the Diet building, have been expanding regardless of participants' affiliation with political parties and other organizations. Many participants are apparently wary of not only the contents of the bills but also the Abe government's high-handed political method, and are dissatisfied with the Diet's failure to stop the prime minister's reckless move. Opinion polls conducted by various news organizations show that a majority of members of the general public are opposed to the bills. Komura's remark suggesting that he regards such public opinion as momentary apparently demonstrates that the LDP has lost its humility.

The security policy as well as the social security policy is something that should not drastically change whenever the government changes. Therefore, it is necessary to form a broad consensus on these policies.

The government submitted the first bill aimed at deploying SDF personnel overseas to the Diet in 1990, but the LDP decided to scrap it after officials failed to explain how it could conform with the Constitution. At the same time, the LDP agreed with its now ruling coalition partner Komeito and the now defunct Democratic Socialist Party to consider opening the way for Japan to dispatch SDF troops exclusively for the purpose of participating in U.N. peacekeeping operations. The move paved the way for the enactment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations law.

There are some points in the security bills over which the ruling coalition could have compromised with the largest opposition Democratic Party of Japan and other opposition parties, except for clauses on the right to collective self-defense. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Abe only urged opposition parties to choose between voting for and against all the bills, and failed to try to form a broad consensus.

If the current situation is to continue, it would shake the foundations of Japan's parliamentary politics. The government should abandon passing the bills into law during the ongoing session and start over from scratch.

毎日新聞 2015年09月15日 東京朝刊


社説:安保転換を問う 集団的自衛権

September 14, 2015 (Mainichi Japan)
Editorial: Numerous holes in gov't explanation of right to collective self-defense
社説:安保転換を問う 集団的自衛権


The government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is aiming to make sure that security-related bills which would open the way for Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense become law by the end of this week.

Many experts have pointed out that the bills constitute a violation of the war-renouncing Constitution, while the majority of the public is opposed to enacting them. One cannot help but wonder why the government is making haste to enact the proposed legislation.

Prime Minister Abe has emphasized that the legislation is necessary to protect the lives and livelihoods of the people. However, no government officials have provided any explanation during some 200 hours of Diet deliberations that have convinced the public of why Japan cannot defend itself unless the country exercises the right to collective self-defense.

Since the House of Councillors began deliberations on the bills following their passage through the House of Representatives, the government has emphasized its concerns about China's military buildup in addition to the threat posed by North Korea. The government apparently aims to gain public understanding of the need for the security legislation by appealing to the public, which harbors a vague anxiety about the security environment surrounding Japan.


It is true that China and North Korea's recent moves are worrisome. As such, it is only natural that some people sympathize with the government's questions as to whether it is all right for Japan to sit by and do nothing.

However, both legislators, government officials and the public should calmly consider what Japan can do and cannot do to respond to the security situation and what kind of legislation should be developed to make up for shortcomings.

Let's consider how to defend Okinawa Prefecture's Senkaku Islands, which are also claimed by China and Taiwan. The Senkakus are part of Japan's territory. Therefore, Japan would exercise the right to individual self-defense to defend the islands in case of an armed attack. The United States would supposedly defend the islands jointly with Japan under Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

Therefore, Japan would respond to contingencies on the islands with its own right to individual self-defense and under the Japan-U.S. security arrangement. Such being the case, Japan would not exercise the right to collective self-defense to respond to such contingencies. A country is supposed to exercise the right to collective self-defense to use force to defend another country that has come under armed attack.

The government has cited minesweeping in the Strait of Hormuz in the Middle East and guarding U.S. military vessels transporting Japanese nationals as specific examples of operations that Japan would conduct by exercising the right to collective self-defense.

Government officials have less actively mentioned minesweeping in the Strait of Hormuz recently in the face of growing criticism over Japan's exercise of the right to collective self-defense for economic reasons.

The government assumes that Japan would defend U.S. military ships carrying Japanese evacuees mainly in case of an armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula although no geographic restrictions are placed on such operations. Prime Minister Abe places particular importance to such missions as examples of cases in which Japan needs to exercise the right to collective self-defense, which he explained by showing charts and illustrations.

However, Defense Minister Gen Nakatani has stated that whether Japanese nationals are aboard U.S. vessels is not an absolute condition for Japan exercising the right to collective self-defense.

In regard to guarding U.S. military vessels in case of an armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula, discussions were also held on defending U.S. Aegis-equipped vessels engaging in missile defense activities. However, it is unrealistic to assume cases where the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) would need to guard U.S. vessels because such vessels seldom operate individually without forming a fleet with other ships in case of emergency. Government officials' statement wavered over this point.

Serious questions remain as to whether the government needs to open the way for Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense by arbitrarily changing the interpretation of the war-renouncing Constitution -- the interpretation that the government had upheld for more than four decades. The government failed to show clear examples of missions that Japan can conduct by only exercising this right in a manner that can convince the public. Therefore, the government's explanation of the matter has collapsed.

The government's primary purpose of enacting security legislation is to enable the SDF to support U.S. combat operations on a global scale and make the bilateral alliance more reciprocal by allowing Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense. By doing so, Japan is trying to encourage the United States to side with countries in the Asia-Pacific region and use the reinforced Japan-U.S. alliance to counter China's military buildup.

From the beginning, the government placed priority on opening the way for Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense rather than repeating discussions on bills necessary to respond to changes in the security environment surrounding Japan.


Therefore, the contents of the bills do not necessarily match specific changes in the actual security environment, making it appear that government officials' explanations have changed frequently.

It is necessary to review Japan's legislation regarding security to respond to changes in the security environment. For example, it would be a good idea for the ruling and opposition parties to discuss expanding logistical support that the SDF can extend to U.S. forces in case of an armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula under the "emergency-at-periphery" law, while retaining geographical restrictions on such activities and a ban on the provision of ammunition to U.S. forces.

However, specific operations that the government claims that the SDF cannot conduct unless the country exercises the right to collective self-defense apparently can be performed by using the right to individual self-defense in principle.

The three new conditions for using force by exercising the right to collective self-defense, such as a threat to Japan's survival, provided for by the proposed security legislation, are ambiguous, and the executive branch of the government would be allowed to judge whether contingencies meet these conditions in a comprehensive manner.

Specific standards for going ahead with the use of force are the most important matter in SDF operations. Under the bills, however, the executive branch could stretch the interpretation of the standards at its own discretion, and there are fears that Japan's use of force overseas could expand without limits.

If the government-sponsored bills are to be enforced, it could rather cause security risks, and eventually lead to political risks.

The Cabinet's decision in July 2014 to allow Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense is inconsistent with the government's past interpretation of the Constitution as banning Japan from exercising the right to collective self-defense even though the country is granted this right under international law. Although experts have pointed out that the bills are unconstitutional, the government has been unable to provide any convincing explanation of the bills' constitutionality.

If the bills are to be passed into law, the stability of the country's legal system, which is headed by the Constitution, would be destroyed. Enactment of the bills would raise concerns that both the government and the Constitution would lose public trust. It could even destabilize Japan's politics.

The government claims that the enactment of the proposed security legislation would strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance and increase deterrence provided by the alliance. The bills may have such advantages, but there are more risks involving the legislation. Such bills should not be enacted.

毎日新聞 2015年09月13日 02時30分


尖閣国有化3年 領土守り抜く体制を構築せよ

The Yomiuri Shimbun
Warning and surveillance system must be firmly secured to protect territory
尖閣国有化3年 領土守り抜く体制を構築せよ

China’s infringements of Japanese sovereignty have been continuing. The government must build a thorough warning and surveillance system, taking into consideration that it will be a long-term struggle.

Friday marked the third anniversary of the nationalization of the Senkaku Islands in Ishigaki, Okinawa Prefecture.

China, which claims sovereignty over the Senkakus, has six to nine of its government vessels intrude into Japanese territorial waters around the islands every month. The number of intruding ships has declined, but their intrusions have become routine. China, building a 10,000-ton-class large patrol boat, clearly intends to continue its saber-rattling activities.

Japan Coast Guard boats have been conducting patrols around the Senkakus and ordering Chinese vessels to exit from Japanese waters whenever they intrude.

It is also necessary to keep an eye on the moves of the Chinese military. China declared in November 2013 the establishment of an air defense identification zone in airspace including that over the Senkakus. Chinese air and maritime forces have bolstered and modernized their military equipment and aim to establish naval and air supremacy in the East and South China seas.

It is right for Ishigaki Mayor Yoshitaka Nakayama to say, “Realistic threats have been mounting.”

The central government and local governments concerned need to share a sense of urgency and work together strategically toward securing territorial integrity.

The JCG has so far managed to deal with Chinese government vessels by mobilizing patrol boats from around the country, but within the current fiscal year it will also establish a system under which it will be able to operate 12 large patrol boats on a full-time basis. It is necessary to establish as soon as possible a constant aerial monitoring system with the use of three jet planes.

It is essential for the JCG and the Self-Defense Forces to cooperate closely in preparing a system capable of ensuring defense seamlessly in anticipation of various scenarios.

Japan-U.S. alliance vital

U.S. President Barack Obama confirmed in spring last year that the Senkakus fall within the scope of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. A firm Japan-U.S. alliance can serve as the greatest deterrence against China.

If security-related bills pass through the Diet, it would expand greatly the cooperation of the SDF and the U.S. military. They must augment joint drills and surveillance activity.

The maritime liaison mechanism must be put into operation as early as possible to prevent accidental clashes between the SDF and Chinese forces.

It is important for the fact that the Senkakus are inherent territories of Japan historically and by international law to be made more widely known and understood overseas.

China conducted an anti-Japan propaganda campaign on the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II this year by linking the event to issues of historical perception. Such moves have caused a drop in Japanese firms’ investment in China and the number of Japanese tourists visiting the country.

Japan and China have become increasingly interdependent in economic terms. Even if there are conflicts on territorial claims and over issues of historical perception, we want the two countries to encourage practical cooperation and personnel exchange.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is exploring the possibility of holding talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping by taking advantage of such occasions as when he attends a U.N. General Assembly later this month and a Japan-China-South Korea summit likely to be scheduled for late October.

Abe and Xi must exchange opinions candidly from a comprehensive viewpoint of a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests.

(From The Yomiuri Shimbun, Sept. 12, 2015)


改正派遣法成立 雇用安定の実効性は高まるか

The Yomiuri Shimbun
Will revised worker dispatch law lead to stable employment, better jobs?
改正派遣法成立 雇用安定の実効性は高まるか

The revised worker dispatch law, one of the main issues at the current Diet session, was enacted Friday by a majority vote supported by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, its junior coalition partner Komeito and others. The revised law comes into force on Sept. 30.

It is important to use the amendment to steadily achieve stable employment and better working conditions for dispatched workers.

A main feature of the revised law is the removal of the effective time limit on companies’ use of temporary labor.

The existing law limits the use of dispatched workers to a maximum of three years, to protect regular employees’ jobs. It excludes 26 job categories, including secretaries, from this rule, but the revised law abolishes these exceptions and allows companies to extend the use of temporary workers in all categories following talks with labor unions and other parties.

However, the revised law also sets a three-year limit on individual dispatched employees working in the same post, in principle, from the viewpoint of having them experience various jobs and improve their skills.

The revised law further obliges temporary staffing companies to help temporary workers improve their careers through such measures as training programs, and work to stabilize their employment through such steps as asking companies to hire them directly.

We think the content of the revised law is appropriate, as it aims to enhance the so-far insufficient protection of dispatched workers, based on the reality that people today work in a variety of ways. It will also make it easier for companies to use dispatched workers.

However, people doing specialist jobs, who can work longer under the existing law, will have to change their posts every three years under the revised one. Many are afraid that their contracts will be terminated. The government should monitor the activities of companies using dispatched workers and temporary staff agencies, and urge them to try to stabilize employment of temporary workers.

Protection for temp workers

During Diet deliberations, the ruling coalition parties claimed that the amendment would open a way for temporary workers to become regular employees and better their working conditions, but the opposition strongly protested that it would increase the number of people who permanently remain dispatched workers.

The House of Councillors passed 39 supplementary resolutions regarding the revised law, reflecting the demands of the opposition parties. This convinced the opposition parties to stop their battle — they had resorted to force, preventing the chair of the Health, Labor and Welfare Committee from entering the conference hall before voting at the House of Representatives.

The additional resolutions urge the government to restrict the amount temporary staffing companies earn for acting as an intermediary, and give instructions to companies that are unwilling to directly hire dispatched workers. These issues should be studied.

The revised law requires every temporary staffing company to obtain government authorization. Some companies are currently allowed to operate just by registering with authorities concerned.

The Health, Labor and Welfare Ministry will deal strictly with temporary staffing companies that fail to provide their workers with occupational and other training, including rescinding their authorization. Whether the ministry is capable of doing that is key to the viability of the revised law.

If the authorization system functions effectively, temporary staffing companies that only offer low costs will be eliminated. We hope the fostering of quality temporary staffing companies will cause dispatched work to become established in our society as an opportunity to improve people’s careers.

(From The Yomiuri Shimbun, Sept. 12, 2015)


消費税10%対策 国民への配慮を欠く財務省案

The Yomiuri Shimbun
Shun benefit payment that slights the public / LDP, Komeito should aim for lower tax rate
消費税10%対策 国民への配慮を欠く財務省案


On top of having little effect to alleviate the public’s sense of pain in paying taxes after an increase in the consumption tax rate, the current proposal would most likely force people to bear needless burdens. A system replete with flaws should never be adopted.

The Finance Ministry has presented to the ruling coalition parties’ tax system reform consultative council a draft the ministry touts as a plan aimed at easing the public’s burdens when the consumption tax rate is raised to 10 percent. The scheme is designed to impose a 10 percent tax on all purchases by consumers and pay back benefits to them at a later date an amount worth 2 percentage points of the tax payments levied on food and beverage items, except alcoholic beverages.

Under this plan, there could be no lowering of payments at the time of purchases, meaning it would play no role in preventing spending on consumption from falling. The ruling parties should turn down the ministry’s draft, and introduce instead a reduced tax rate system in the true sense of the term to ensure tax rates on daily necessities such as food are kept down.

Shabby dole-out policy

The Finance Ministry describes its tax burden alleviation measures as a “Japanese version of a reduced tax rate system.”

Skeptical views were voiced one after another at the coalition parties’ consultative panel meeting on Thursday, such as that the idea put forth by the ministry should be deemed at best a “pseudo-reduced rate method.” This is because applying the same tax rate on all goods and paying cash later to the public is nothing but a government benefit measure.

Bunmei Ibuki, who is a former finance minister and an authority on taxation affairs, at a meeting the same day of the Liberal Democratic Party’s Nikai faction — led by party General Council Chairman Toshihiro Nikai — harshly criticized the ministry’s plan, saying it is “an idea disgraceful for the Finance Ministry, as it could amount to a dole-out measure like a welfare benefit.”

In their common electoral pledge for the House of Representatives election in December 2014, the LDP and its ruling coalition partner Komeito did commit to introducing a reduced tax rate system at the time of the consumption tax being hiked to 10 percent. Should the ruling parties adopt the ministry’s draft and insist obstinately that it should be considered a form of reduced tax rate formula, that would be tantamount to duping the public.

The ministry’s draft calls for setting no limits on incomes for eligibility for receiving the benefits, with a view to having the benefits paid to people in all income brackets, including high-income persons. At the same time, the ministry is poised to set a cap on the benefits at around ¥5,000 a year per person.

When the government raised the consumption tax rate to 8 percent in April 2014, it used what the government referred to as a “plain benefit measure” of lump-sum payouts ranging from ¥10,000 to ¥15,000 per person among low-income people, but that measure failed to produce any tangible effect in shoring up the economy. The ministry-proposed benefit measure would have an even lesser impact.

Likewise, little effect could be hoped for from the ministry-envisaged plan in mitigating the sense of burden on low-income earners.

No help for less well-off

Many members of the ruling parties’ tax system panel also expressed skepticism about whether it was realistic to use My Number ID cards to calculate the amount of consumption tax on purchases of food and beverages.

When making a purchase at a shop, a consumer will hold their card up to an ID card-reading terminal unit. This purchase information will then be collected at a newly established “center for accumulating data on reimbursement.” The consumer will then either go down to the tax office or elsewhere or apply online for the benefit payment.

The consumption tax rate is scheduled to be increased to 10 percent in April 2017. Will it be possible to ensure terminal units are installed at every single one of the estimated 800,000 retailers and food outlets across Japan by then? Even the distribution of My Number cards might not be completed at that stage.

Each terminal is expected to cost tens of thousands of yen to purchase and install. Making sure that the payment system stretches across the entire nation also will entail other costs. Maintaining and managing the new data center, bank transfer fees to be paid when remitting benefit payment, and the labor costs of employees in charge of this work are just some of the factors that will create a new financial burden.

At the panel meeting, a member of the Liberal Democratic Party who had misgivings about the benefit payment system likened it to the building method that caused the construction costs of the New National Stadium to balloon. “We must not allow this to become a second case of ‘keel arches,’” the member said, referring to the gigantic arches envisaged to support a retractable roof at the stadium.

Another panel member pointed to the complications involved in getting consumers to use the system, and wondered whether it is realistic to expect every resident to carry their My Number card every time they go shopping.

Many people are also concerned that their personal information could be leaked or unlawfully used if the cards are lost or stolen.

At a press conference, Finance Minister Taro Aso said: “If people don’t want to carry their cards, they don’t have to carry them. They will just miss out on the reduced tax by that much.” It appears Aso does not understand at all the true sentiment of people who are having a tough time managing the household budget.

Some elderly people and others who would want to get the benefit payment have not mastered the use of personal computers and smartphones. We think a reduced consumption tax rate that does not impose any unnecessary trouble on people would be a fairer, simpler system for everybody.

Learn from Europe

The Finance Ministry’s reasoning for avoiding the introduction of a lower tax rate on some items is that it would be difficult to draw a line between items subject to the lower rate and those that are not, and that having several rates would generate a heavy administrative burden when compiling invoices where tax amounts are entered for every transaction.

Selecting items to be subject to a lower tax rate would indeed require considerable time and effort. But adjusting the advantages and disadvantages of the tax system and making it realistic is precisely the primary duty of politics.

Major countries in Europe have implemented lower tax rates on some items for more than half a century.

These lower rates are imposed on food and also newspapers and books, which are essential for preserving the culture of the printed word. Concerns over invoices have not hindered commercial transactions in any way in these nations.

There is no reason why today’s Japan could not implement such a system.

(From The Yomiuri Shimbun, Sept. 11, 2015)Speech


(社説)参院審議、大詰めへ 「違憲」法案に反対する

--The Asahi Shimbun, Sept. 10
EDITORIAL: 'Unconstitutional' security legislation must be killed
(社説)参院審議、大詰めへ 「違憲」法案に反対する

Upper House deliberations on contentious government-drafted national security legislation are entering the final stage.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who was re-elected Sept. 8 as president of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, intends to seek a vote on the package of bills for passage next week.

But public opinion remains highly critical of the legislation that would drastically change the overseas role of the Self-Defense Forces.

In an Asahi Shimbun poll in late August, 30 percent of the respondents expressed support for the legislation and 51 percent were opposed. Asked whether they thought the legislation needed to be enacted during the current Diet session, only 20 percent of those polled said yes, while 65 percent answered no.

Many experts assert the legislation is unconstitutional. People across Japan have joined demonstrations to protest the bills. It is hard to claim a national consensus has been formed on the need for the legislation.

If the LDP-led ruling coalition rams the bills through the Upper House by using its majority in the chamber, the schism between the people and politics will only deepen.


We again urge the Abe administration to stop forging ahead with this initiative.

Forcing “unconstitutional” legislation through the Diet is unacceptable. The bills should be quashed, and the government should start from scratch.

Given China’s rise as a major and assertive military power and other factors, the Abe administration argues that it is necessary to allow Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense in limited situations because the security environment surrounding the nation has changed. Many Japanese agree with this view.

What is impressive about public opinion with regard to the legislation, on the other hand, is the wide spectrum of arguments against it. Opposition to the legislation has been voiced by people of all ideological stripes, including both those who are for and against constitutional amendments.

Some people have said Japan must not abandon the pacifist credo which it adopted after serious soul-searching about its actions during World War II and has been maintaining throughout the postwar period.

Members of nongovernment organizations have warned that expanding the scope of SDF activities in regions like the Middle East could stir up antagonism against Japan.

There are others who think the Constitution should be amended and criticize the way the government has made it possible for Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense simply through a change in the traditional interpretation of the Constitution. This approach, they say, runs against the principle of constitutionalism, which in essence means that the government’s power is defined and limited by the Constitution.

The administration has turned a deaf ear to all these dissenting voices.

When former Supreme Court Chief Justice Shigeru Yamaguchi said that the legislation is unconstitutional, Defense Minister Gen Nakatani downplayed the importance of Yamaguchi’s opinion by stating the remarks were uttered by “one private individual who has retired from office.” Nakatani’s comment symbolized the administration’s complete lack of respect for expert opinion.


The Abe administration contends there is a policy imperative to make it possible for Japan to use the right to collective self-defense. If so, the logical step the administration should follow is to make its case for this policy change to the public and seek support for the necessary amendment to the Constitution.

In fact, for a while Abe called for a revision of Article 96 of the Constitution to lower the bar for constitutional amendments, pledging to “get the Constitution back into the hands of the people.” His true aim in making that move was apparently an amendment to the war-renouncing Article 9.

After his bid to revise Article 96 was criticized as a violation of the principle of constitutionalism, Abe switched to achieving his security policy goal through a change in the government’s interpretation of the Constitution.

The radical reinterpretation of the Constitution was formalized with a Cabinet decision involving only a small number of ministers. The administration is now trying to ram the legislation based on that policy shift through the Diet by taking advantage of the overwhelming parliamentary majority commanded by the ruling alliance for an effective amendment to the Constitution.

The administration has omitted the process of building consensus among the public and made do with an agreement reached within the government and the ruling camp without participation by the public.

Now, the Constitution is being taken away from the hands of the people.

As a result, legal stability is being undermined in more ways than one.

No matter what answers the government gives to related questions at the Diet, many Japanese cannot help but suspect that the government could change its position in the future. That’s why people are finding it hard not to be concerned that conscription may someday be adopted, no matter how strongly Abe rules out the possibility.

After the package of security bills is passed into law, there will likely be a wave of lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the legislation.

It is also possible that the government’s interpretation of the Constitution may be altered again after a regime change.

The Abe administration is poised to push the legislation through the Diet without even clarifying the vague concept of “the crisis of the nation’s survival,” which it says would justify Japan engaging in collective self-defense.

The lack of an effective system to prevent arbitrary enforcement of the law inevitably gives the government even greater discretion in making security policy decisions.

The SDF must not be deployed to dangerous overseas operations under such unstable circumstances.


Another thing the security legislation is threatening to undermine is the importance of Article 9.

The Abe administration appears to be trying to expand the scope of the tasks and areas for the SDF's overseas operations, enhance the SDF’s cooperation with the forces of the United States and other countries and thereby enhance deterrence against China. It also seems to regard Article 9 as an impediment to Japan’s national security and want to reduce its implications for security policy so that Japan can play a greater military role in the international community.

If the “proactive pacifism” the administration has been advocating means pushing the nation in this direction, it marks a radical departure from the postwar pacifism that has enabled Japan to maintain a distance from direct involvement in overseas conflicts, even if the two may look similar.

Let us think afresh about the meaning of Article 9, which states the Japanese people “forever renounce war.”

It has helped Japan to maintain a distance from U.S. military actions, which on occasion are staged for a wrong war. It has also helped Japan to build relationships based on mutual trust with its neighbors, including China and South Korea, and avoid the folly of participating in a futile arms race. Japan, as a pacifist nation underpinned by Article 9, can play a useful role as mediator in the Middle East.

Article 9 has played no small part in Japan’s pacifist diplomacy in the postwar period, although it has also created challenges under the harsh reality facing the world.

To be sure, a certain degree of deterrence provided by the U.S. forces and the SDF is necessary for Japan’s security. It is vital to make efforts to bolster the reliability of deterrence.

That, however, doesn’t mean that enacting the “unconstitutional” security legislation in such a rash manner is the only way to accomplish that.

As for expanding Japan’s international contributions, widening the scope of overseas SDF deployments is not the only option.

There are a plethora of international challenges Japan should tackle, such as aid to refugees, efforts to deal with infectious diseases and mediation to solve conflicts. There must be ways for Japan to expand and upgrade its diplomatic activities by combining efforts to tackle these challenges in line with its commitment to Article 9.

Using the power of numbers to turn the colorful landscape of Japanese people’s views and opinions into a monochrome picture would stifle people’s efforts to envision the future of the nation.







[ はじめに ]

[ 名前 ]
松井 清 (スラチャイ)

[ 略歴 ]
・99/10 タイ全土を旅行
・00/10 タイに移住
・03/07 カイちゃん誕生
・07/06 シーファーちゃん誕生

[ 座右の銘 ]
Slow and steady wins the race.

[ 学習の手引き ]
・Think in English.

[ English Newspapers ]
Japan Times
Washington Post
Newyork Times
Bangkok Post
The Nations
Phuket Gazette

[ 英字新聞の英和対訳学習 ]

[ スラチャイ編集の辞書 ]

[ 英字新聞リンク ]
ocn cafe


[ 32レッドカジノ ]

[ online casino ]

[ 32red casino mobile ]
for iPhone, Android
Roulette Game
Blackjack Game
Slots Game

[ my favorite way ]
Earning some money on the commuting train is fantastic.
roulette game

[ 32red casino iPhone & Android ]
Mermaids Millions
Royal Derby
Tomb Raider
Blackjack Game
Major Millions

Tomb Raider iTunes App
Blackjack iTunes App
Roulette Game
Android & iPhone Direct Registration

[ sellection for mobile ]
32Red Web App (iPhone & Android) Casino - Homepage

[ 32red download for PC ]

[ online casino for PC ]
Online Slots

[ zipang casino ]
in english

seesaa100 英字新聞s HPs





01 あいさつ
02 別れのあいさつ
03 声をかけるとき
04 感謝の言葉と答え方
05 謝罪の言葉と答え方
06 聞き直すとき
07 相手の言うことがわからないとき
08 うまく言えないとき
09 一般的なあいづち
10 よくわからないときの返事
11 強めのあいづち
12 自分について述べるとき
13 相手のことを尋ねるとき
14 頼みごとをするとき
15 申し出・依頼を断るとき
16 許可を求めるとき
17 説明してもらうとき
18 確認を求めるとき
19 状況を知りたいとき
20 値段の尋ね方と断り方
21 急いでもらいたいとき
22 待ってもらいたいとき
23 日時・場所・天候を尋ねるとき
24 その他

01 あいさつ
02 別れのあいさつ
03 声をかけるとき
04 感謝の言葉と答え方
05 謝罪の言葉と答え方
06 聞き直すとき
07 相手の言うことがわからないとき
08 うまく言えないとき
09 一般的なあいづち
10 よくわからないときの返事
11 強めのあいづち
12 自分について述べるとき
13 相手のことを尋ねるとき
14 頼みごとをするとき
15 申し出・依頼を断るとき
16 許可を求めるとき
17 説明してもらうとき
18 確認を求めるとき
19 状況を知りたいとき
20 値段の尋ね方と断り方
21 急いでもらいたいとき
22 待ってもらいたいとき
23 日時・場所・天候を尋ねるとき
24 その他

01 雨の日にも傘をささないタイ人
02 勉強熱心なタイ人女性たち
03 タイ人は敬謙な仏教徒
04 タイの市場
05 タイの食堂
06 タイ人は外食が大好き
07 果物王国タイランド
08 タイ人の誕生日
09 タイの電話代は高い
10 微笑みの国タイランド



[ 英字新聞リンク ]
yahoo geolog

[ HPリンク ]
cocolog 家族のアルバム
fc2 家族のアルバム
Preliminary Japanese lessons for Thai students

  • ライブドアブログ